Fair Competition Guidelines for the Telecommunications Market

The Cambodian telecommunications market has, since the mid-2000s, developed into a competitive environment in which several mobile operators, internet service providers and infrastructure companies operate alongside a limited number of state-linked entities. The Law on Telecommunications and its implementing regulations recognise the importance of fair competition and empower the regulator to take measures against anti-competitive conduct. The 2023 guidelines respond to accumulated experience and stakeholder feedback by describing more clearly how the regulator approaches competition matters in the sector.

The guidelines are relevant to all licensed telecommunications operators, to companies providing services that compete with or complement licensed operators, and to investors evaluating market entry or expansion. They also inform the way in which mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures involving telecommunications assets are assessed by the sector regulator.

The guidelines address the main categories of conduct that may raise competition concerns in the telecommunications sector: abuse of a dominant position, agreements or concerted practices between competitors that restrict competition, and mergers or acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition. They also address structural questions such as access to essential facilities, wholesale pricing and the treatment of vertically integrated operators.

The guidelines apply alongside general competition rules that may exist in Cambodian law and alongside consumer-protection rules that address unfair commercial practices. Where an alleged practice falls at the intersection of these frameworks, the regulator will typically coordinate with other authorities and, where necessary, focus its own action on the sector-specific dimension.

In assessing competition matters, the regulator begins with a definition of the relevant market. In telecommunications this typically involves distinguishing between retail and wholesale layers, between fixed and mobile services, between voice, messaging and data services, and between residential and business customer segments. Geographic markets are usually assessed at national level, although narrower geographic definitions may be appropriate for infrastructure services with local characteristics.

Dominance is then assessed by reference to market shares, barriers to entry, countervailing buyer power and the ability of a firm to act independently of competitors and customers. A high market share is an indicator of dominance but is not decisive on its own. Where dominance is established, the guidelines describe the categories of conduct that may amount to abuse, including excessive pricing, predatory pricing, margin squeeze, exclusive dealing, tying, refusal to deal on reasonable terms and discriminatory access to infrastructure.

The guidelines pay particular attention to conduct at the wholesale layer, where operators depend on each other for interconnection, transit, backhaul and access to passive infrastructure. Dominant operators are expected to provide access on reasonable, non-discriminatory terms, to publish reference offers where required and to negotiate in good faith. The regulator may intervene where an offer is unreasonable, where negotiations stall or where the terms proposed foreclose competitors from operating effectively at retail level.

Vertically integrated operators face specific expectations. They should not use their control of upstream assets to disadvantage downstream competitors, whether through pricing, technical arrangements or delays. Accounting separation, functional separation or, in serious cases, structural remedies may be considered where softer measures prove insufficient. The guidelines describe the analytical framework that the regulator uses to evaluate margin squeeze allegations, including the tests it applies to compare wholesale prices and downstream retail prices.

Agreements between competitors that fix prices, share markets, coordinate on tenders or exchange sensitive information are treated as serious breaches of competition principles. The guidelines describe the types of information exchanges that raise concern, including sharing of individual firm data on prices, capacity or investment plans that may facilitate coordinated behaviour. They also acknowledge that certain cooperative arrangements, such as tower sharing, roaming or joint deployment of new technologies, may be pro-competitive and are typically welcomed where they are transparent, non-exclusive and open to further participation.

Where a merger, acquisition or joint venture involves telecommunications assets, the sector regulator will typically assess whether the transaction may substantially lessen competition in any relevant market. The guidelines describe the information the regulator expects to receive, the timeline for review and the types of remedy that may be considered, including divestitures, behavioural commitments and access obligations. The framework works alongside any general merger control regime and is intended to complement rather than replicate that process.

For investors, the guidelines provide a clearer sense of how transactions will be reviewed and what evidence will support a positive outcome. Early engagement with the regulator, transparent disclosure of the transaction rationale and a credible assessment of competitive effects are all likely to make the review process smoother.

For dominant operators, the practical effect of the guidelines is that competition compliance should be treated as a continuing internal function rather than an occasional legal exercise. Pricing decisions, wholesale offers, exclusivity arrangements and technical access conditions should be reviewed against competition principles, and staff involved in commercial negotiations should be trained on the categories of conduct that may raise concern. Records should be maintained sufficient to explain the commercial rationale for material decisions.

For smaller operators and new entrants, the guidelines are useful in framing complaints about market conduct that they consider to be anti-competitive. The regulator generally expects a well-documented complaint that identifies the relevant market, describes the alleged conduct and provides evidence of harm. Anecdotal or speculative complaints are less likely to lead to intervention.

For over-the-top service providers and platform operators, the guidelines are a reminder that although they may not hold telecommunications licences, their conduct in Cambodia may be relevant to competition analysis, particularly where they interact with licensed operators through interconnection, content agreements or joint marketing.

Lex Civora advises operators, investors and other stakeholders on the interpretation of the fair competition guidelines, on the design of internal compliance programmes, on complaint strategy and on merger review in the telecommunications sector. The firm assists clients in engaging constructively with the regulator, presenting evidence in a structured way and negotiating remedies that address competition concerns while preserving legitimate commercial interests.